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ARGUMENT
I.

The

When It Concluded That Evidence Of The Victim’s Toxicology
Screen Was Relevant And Admissible To Prove Comparative Negligence

District

A.

Court Erred

Introduction

The evidence

related t0 the Victim’s toxicology screen

was

irrelevant t0

Ochoa’s

negligence or the cause of the Victim’s death; the magistrate properly excluded
irrelevant

and unfairly

prejudicial;

theory of comparative negligence

18.)

Ochoa does not

district court

and the

When

it

district court

how the

is

not relevant to her negligence or that the

(Respondent’s

that the toxicology screen evidence

causation and not unfairly prejudicial.

articulate

evidence in question

legal

legal theory, but claims that the district court

nevertheless correctly reversed the magistrate.

Ochoa contends

as

reversed 0n appeal. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-

dispute that the evidence

employed an erroneous

employed an erroneous

it

(Respondent’s

is

was

brief, p. 8.1)

Speciﬁcally,

relevant t0 the element 0f

brief, pp. 8-12.)

Ochoa

fails to

relevant t0 the Victim’s cause of death, however.

Application of the correct legal standards shows the magistrate did not err in excluding the

evidence and that the

district court erred in

reversing on intermediate appeal.

1

Ochoa also argues the state did not preserve the issue of relevancy for appeal because it
“only argued that the toxicology results were speculative and overly prejudicial t0 the
courts below.” (Respondent’s brief, p. 9.) The state’s ﬁrst topic heading in its motion in
limine was:

“The victim’s toxicology

results are not relevant t0 Defendant’s vehicular

manslaughter charge because there
contributed to the collision.”

(R., p.

is n0 evidence the substances in his blood
44 (holding original).) The State argued: “The

Methamphetamine

in the Victim’s system is irrelevant because it does alter the probability
Defendant was a signiﬁcant cause in contributing t0 the Victim’s death.” (R., p.
45.) Ochoa’s contention that the state did not preserve the relevancy argument is specious.
that the

1

The Evidence Of The Victim’s Toxicology Screening Was Irrelevant T0 Whether
Ochoa’s Failure T0 Yield The Right OfWaV Was A Signiﬁcant Cause Contributing
T0 The Victim’s Death

B.

Evidence
than

it

is

relevant if

it

has “any tendency t0

would be without the evidence.”

manslaughter

is

met

if the

I.R.E. 401(a).

make

a fact

more or

The causation element

defendant’s operation of her motor vehicle

cause contributing to the [Victim’s] death.” LC.

less

§ 18-4006(3)(c).

probable

for vehicular

was “a signiﬁcant

A Victim’s negligence

negates the defendant’s negligence as a cause of death only where such negligence was “an

unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence” that “breaks the causal chain between the

Thompson V.

defendant’s culpable act and the Victim’s injury.”

State,

164 Idaho 821, 826,

436 P.3d 642, 647 (2019) (quotation marks omitted). The presence of methamphetamine
in the Victim’s

system alone does not tend to show that the accident would not have

occurred but for the Victim’s methamphetamine use, nor does

would not have died
fact that the Victim

as a result 0f the accident but for his

had methamphetamine

in his

it

tend to show that the Victim

methamphetamine

system

is

not relevant t0

use.

The mere

show

that the

causal chain between Ochoa’s failure t0 yield the right 0f way and the Victim’s death has

been broken.

(E Appellant’s brief, pp.

Ochoa argues

that the

6

‘Victim’s use 0f a cocktail of illegal substances

entirely independent act that could not

presents n0 explanation for

Victim’s death.

of

how

12-18.)

have been reasonably foreseen by Ms. Ochoa,” but

how it breaks the

(Respondent’s

was an

causal chain between her culpable act and the

brief, pp. 8-10.)

Her argument,

at best,

begs the question

the “unforeseen” ingestion 0f a “cocktail 0f illegal substances”

probable that Ochoa’s driving was a substantial cause of the Victim’s death.

makes

it

less

Ochoa’s argument

0f the Victim’s toxicology screen shows an

that evidence

intervening 0r superseding cause 0f his death

Evidence “that amounts
admissible.”

is,

to speculation or conjecture is not relevant

State V. Marks, 156 Idaho 559, 563,

Ochoa argues

that the issue

smoke and mirrors” because

other substances

the

(Respondent’s

was

Victim’s blood

brief, pp. 10-1 1.2)

positive for

The

is

failure to yield that

internal bleeding that killed the Victim.

t0 present evidence

an

the

actual

facts

that

existed.”

test

But not every actual

As

positive blood test

Ochoa

is

not ipso facto an

argues.

caused the accident which caused the massive
set forth in the state’s brief,

Ochoa was allowed

0f how the Victim’s driving might have been a cause 0f the accident, in

effort t0 negate the inference that

of the Victim’s positive blood

As Ochoa

by

the presence 0f methamphetamine and

part 0f “the

A

Ochoa’s

test for

points out, the Trooper

was a

substantial cause of the

failed t0

show how the evidence

failure t0 yield

Victim’s death. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-18.)

2

App. 2014).

The positive test result is causally tied to the Victim’s death with

intervening, superseding cause of death as

was Ochoa’s

(Ct.

speculative, as found

actual fact that existed.

only the gossamer threads of speculation.

It

is

and therefore not

does not dispute that the Victim’s blood

state

methamphetamine was an

fact that exists is relevant.

328 P.3d 539, 543

0f Whether the evidence

magistrate, “is simply

in

and remains, based 0n speculation.

Ochoa has

drugs adds anything relevant t0 the analysis 0f how

who

investigated the crash concluded and put in his

was under the inﬂuence of methamphetamine because the toxicology
methamphetamine was up t0 100.
(Respondent’s brief, pp. 4, 10 (citing Exhibits, p. 97 (4/23/19 Tr., p. 93, L. 20 — p. 94, L.
19).) The Trooper also testiﬁed, however, that he was unable make a determination if the
Victim was impaired by that level of methamphetamine in his system. (Exhibits, p. 97
The claim that the Victim was impaired by the
(4/23/19 Tr., p. 95, Ls. 2-10).)
methamphetamine in his system is speculative, and even if there was impairment the claim
that said impairment was an intervening or superseding causation of death is speculative.
report that the Victim

report indicated 170 while the therapeutic range for

3

the Victim’s driving

therefore his death.

may

0r

may not have been the

The mere presence of the

cause of the accident, his injuries, and

drugs, Without more,

is

not an intervening

cause and therefore does not tend t0 negate the fact that Ochoa’s driving was a substantial
cause 0f the Victim’s death.

The Magistrate Did Not Abuse His Discretion BV Excluding The Evidence Of The
Victim’s Toxicology Screening Because It Was Unfaier Preiudicial

C.

Even
substantially

if

evidence

outweighed by a danger 0f

misleading the jury.” I.R.E. 403.
not abuse

that

its

discretion

when

any probative value

it

may

relevant, a court

is

it

As

exclude

it

“if

The

district court

probative value

unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,

is

[01']

set forth in the state’s initial brief, the magistrate did

concluded that the toxicology evidence was so speculative

might have had was substantially outweighed by the danger 0f

unfair prejudice, confusion 0f the issues, and misleading the jury.

17-18.)

its

did not

(Appellant’s brief, pp.

ﬁnd any abuse of discretion, and

therefore erroneously

reversed. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-18.)

Ochoa argues

that the

danger 0f unfair prejudice was minimal because society

very tolerant 0f methamphetamine use and the probative value of the evidence
(Respondent’s

brief, p. 11.)

This argument

fails for several reasons.

address the district court’s error. Apparently
that the district court erred

failing t0

by

Ochoa does not

First,

it

is

is

high.

does not

dispute the state’s assertion

failing to address the magistrate’s alternative ruling

and

apply the relevant legal standards.

Second, Ochoa’s argument also
contends that the toxicology evidence

fails to

is

address the relevant legal standards.

analogous t0 the

evidence 0f the Victim’s death in a murder

trial.

The

state presenting

state fails t0 see

Ochoa

autopsy or other

how the presentation

0f autopsy evidence or photographs 0f the Victim’s corpse invites speculation on whether
the Victim

is

dead in the same

way that

evidence 0f the Victim’s toxicology testing invites

Ochoa does not actually

speculation that methamphetamine use caused the Victim’s death.

address the state’s argument or the district court’s ruling that the evidence would merely
invite the jury t0 speculate

Finally,

ruling,

it

even

if

how the methamphetamine use relates

Ochoa’s analysis were in any way relevant

does not show an abuse 0f discretion.

establish the relevance 0f the evidence,

of a superseding cause 0f death.
because the public
magistrate.

is

to the issues

tolerant of

much

As

t0 the magistrate’s

set forth above, she

less establish that

it

of the case.

has failed to

was “highly probative”

Likewise, her estimation that the

harm was minimal,

methamphetamine abuse, was hardly binding on the

The magistrate did not abuse

its

discretion

by concluding

that the danger

0f

unfair prejudice, confusion 0f the issues, and misleading the jury substantially outweighed
the probative value of the toxicology evidence.

The

district court erred

when it reversed 0n

appeal.

II.

The

District

A.

When It Concluded That The Trial Court Abused Its
BV Denying Ochoa’s Motion For A Continuance

Court Erred

The Trial Court Correctly Determined That Any Prejudice From The Timing Of
The Defense Obtaining Medical Records And The Toxicology Report Was The
Product Of The Defense Delaying Its Request For Those Documents, Not The
State’s Tardiness In Responding To The Requests

As shown

in the Appellant’s brief

and as found by the

strategic reasons,3 delayed requesting discovery

3

The

Discretion

strategic reason

brief, pp. 4-8, 21-22.)

was

t0 pursue exclusion

trial court,

the defense, for

of the Victim’s medical records

until

of Dr. Groben as a Witness. (Appellant’s

March

28, 2019, and the state produced the hospital records

toxicology report 0n
standard, applied

May

by the

7,

on April

10,

2019. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-8, 18-25.) The correct legal

magistrate,

is to

review Whether the

state’s tardiness in

the evidence caused prejudice t0 the defense so substantial that the defense

fair trial.

E

129 Idaho 386, 389, 924 P.2d 1230, 1233

(Ct.

App. 1996).

when

applied a legally erroneous standard on appeal
request for the medical records

was

irrelevant t0

and the only consideration was when,

trial

based on

the state’s tardiness in production, but the defense’s

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-25.)

tardiness in seeking the discovery.

was denied a

In this case the magistrate

properly concluded that any prejudice in the defense’s ability to prepare for

was not

producing

899 P.2d 959, 965 (1995); State V. Canelo,

State V. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 255,

the timing of the disclosures

2019, and the

it

The

district court

concluded that the timing of the

Whether a continuance should be granted

in relation t0 the trial, the

documents were obtained.

(Id.)

Ochoa has chosen

to not

respond to the

state’s

primary argument 0n appeal.

(Respondent’s brief, pp. 12- 1 5.) The state’s argument—that the magistrate properly denied
the continuance motions because the timing of the production of the medical records and

toxicology report arose from the defense’s tactical choice t0 delay making a discovery
request for three months until the eve of

state’s

trial,

response to those requests, and that the

and not from any alleged tardiness
district court erred

timing of the discovery request was irrelevant t0 the

trial

by concluding

in the

that the

court’s exercise of discretion in

denying the continuance request was erroneous—stands unrebutted.

B.

In

The

The
prejudice at

Alternative,

Ochoa Has

ﬂawed by

the

evidentiary issues: t0 wit, that

T0 Show Any Prejudice At The

secondary argument, that the

state also presents a

trial is

Failed

same

error the district court

(Respondent’s

brief, pp. 13-15.)

ultimate conclusion that she

Ochoa’s argument

was prejudiced was

was

analysis of the

Ochoa

possible t0 review these documents

undercut, or even belied,

by

trial

determine prejudice in

trial

the documents are

Appellate counsel’s argument that as

was necessary to adequately prepare

much

for trial

is

time as
severely

counsel’s decision to delay any efforts to obtain these

its

to prepare for trial given

minute to request documents

district court erred, the

arguments are without merit.

may

brief, pp. 13-15.)

unsupported (and unsupportable) by any

been spent. As the magistrate determined, a party
to wait until the last

(Respondent’s

Her argument that

documents for months. The magistrate did not abuse

more time

district court’s

correct, only that the district court’s

correct.

count.

fair trial are

citation t0 evidence in the record.

0fthe case. The

its

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 23-24.)

ultimately that a court

is

by the expedient 0f a simple page

entitled to

in

Again, however, Ochoa does not claim the

exculpatory and necessary for a

was not

made

of

argument, asserting generally that her trial preparation was prejudiced.

this

application 0f comparative negligence standards

preparation

district court’s analysis

applied an incorrect relevance analysis based on the

it

inapplicable standards 0f comparative negligence.

does respond t0

Trial

discretion

how

the time initially given

may not force
it

by concluding Ochoa

was aware

magistrate did not abuse

a continuance

by

had

electing

existed from the beginning

its

discretion,

and Ochoa’s

III.

The

District

Court Erroneouslv Found Dr. Groben’s Expert Testimony Based

On Medical

Records Inadmissible
A.

Introduction

The magistrate applied

the correct legal standards to the objection that Dr.

should not be allowed to disclose
his opinion.

at trial the facts

and data 0n which he relied

The

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 27-28.)

district court

because

Groben

t0 formulate

did not apply the correct

did not recognize the proper

legal standards to the appellate issue before

it

standard of review and did not defer t0 the

court’s factual ﬁndings, instead substituting

its

own

factual

trial

it

ﬁndings (Which are contrary t0 the record). (Appellant’s

In responding t0 the state’s arguments

brief, pp. 28-30.)

Ochoa again does not dispute that the

district

court applied an incorrect legal standard, but contends the magistrate nevertheless erred.

(Respondent’s

brief, pp. 15-18.)

shows no such

error as claimed

B.

Application of the relevant legal standards to the record

by Ochoa.

The Magistrate Did Not Abuse His Discretion BV Allowing Dr. Groben To Testify
Regarding The Facts And Data Underlying His Opinion
Dr.

Groben testiﬁed

that in his opinion as a pathologist the cause

0f the Victim’s

death was “blunt force trauma due t0 a motorcycle accident” and the “manner 0f death was
accident.” (Exhibits, p. 162 (TL, p. 353, L. 21

— p.

354, L. 3).) This opinion

was based 0n

the doctor’s expertise and training, an inspection 0f the Victim’s body, and a review 0f the

medical records. (Exhibits, pp. 153-56
L. 16

— p.

349, L. 23).)

318, L.

None 0f this testimony was

Over defense objection
Groben was allowed t0

(Tr., p.

1

— p.

objected

328, L.

t0,

nor was

(Exhibits, pp. 156-60 (TL, p. 328, L. 9

testify that the

161 (TL, p. 348,

8),

it

— p.

objectionable.

346, L. 19)), Dr.

medical records he reviewed showed the Victim had

died at the hospital (Exhibits, p. 161 (TL, p. 349, Ls. 3-9)) and that the Victim had suffered
a collapsed lung 0n the right side, bruising, multiple bi-lateral and displaced rib fractures,
pelvic fractures, and “tearing 0f the arteries”

Which caused “uncontrolled bleeding

his pelvic cavity” (Exhibits, pp. 161-62 (TL, p. 351, L. 11

— p.

352, L. 11)).

The severing

0fthe arteries caused “[u]ncontrolled bleeding and refractory hypotension,” Which
loss so severe

162

(p.

it

results in loss

0f oxygen t0 the

cells that

inside

is

blood

cannot be reversed. (Exhibits,

p.

352, L. 24 —p. 353, L. 16).)

The

legal standard for admission

an expert in reaching an opinion
the proponent 0f the opinion

is:

of evidence 0f the

“if the facts 0r data

may disclose them to

facts

and data relied upon by

would otherwise be inadmissible,

the jury only if their probative value in

helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”
I.R.E. 703.

that,

The magistrate applied

this standard t0 the

hearsay objection and concluded

although the testimony regarding the facts and data (as gleaned from the medical

records)

was otherwise inadmissible

hearsay, the probative value 0f the evidence to help

the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighed

160 (Tn,

p.

345, L. 17

The only

— p.

its

prejudicial effect.

(Exhibits, p.

346, L. 19).)

legal authority

Ochoa

cites substantively4 is State V.

Watkins, 148 Idaho

418, 224 P.3d 485 (2009). (Respondent’s brief, pp. 17-18.) In that case the Supreme Court

0f Idaho held that “I.R.E. 703 serves t0 prevent an expert witness from serving as
a conduit for the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence.”
494.

4

In that case the trial court did not

Ochoa

“make

I_d.

at

427, 224 P.3d

at

a ﬁnding” that the challenged hearsay

also sets forth the standard 0f review. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 15-16.)

evidence regarding

DNA testing 0f various items was “admitted for the limited purpose 0f

evaluating [the expert’s] opinion.”

I_d.

Rather, the evidence in question

was used

for the

improper purpose of “demonstrating the chain 0f custody, [another person’s] testing
methodology, and to identify the locations on the condom and panties 0n which Watkins’

and the Victim’s
hearsay

may

DNA were found.”

Li.

Watkins does not stand for the proposition

be admitted under I.R.E. 703—the rule

itself applies t0

that

no

admission of

“otherwise inadmissible” evidence—but rather for the proposition that the evidence must
serve the limited purpose of helping the jury evaluate the expert’s opinion and even then

is

admissible only after the proper balancing has been performed.
In contrast to Watkins, the magistrate

made

datas [sic] as t0 the injuries that were sustained

understand the cause 0f death.” (Exhibits,
speciﬁcally distinguished

WLkins on

p.

the required

by

160 (TL,

ﬁnding

[the Victim]

p.

that the “facts

would help

346, Ls. 12-18).)

and

the jury t0

The magistrate

the basis that in that case the evidence

was used

t0

establish facts outside the scope of the expert opinion. (Exhibits, p. 160 (T12, p. 345, L. 18

— p.

346, L. 12).)

The record shows that the magistrate, unlike the court in

m,

applied

the proper standards and properly admitted the testimony.

Using some selective editing and quotes out of context, Ochoa contends Dr. Groben
did not reach an independent conclusion as t0 the cause 0f the Victim’s death, but instead

merely recited what the treating doctors had concluded. (Respondent’s

The

parts of Dr. Groben’s testimony not

brief, pp. 16-17.)

mentioned or addressed by Ochoa include Dr.

Groben’s testimony that “[m]edical records are absolutely important t0 determine— 0r me
t0

determine what caused this person’s death,” and that looking

at the

medical records was

important for his conclusion regarding the cause of death because the medical records were

10

“absolutely the best form of information [he] could get.” (Exhibits, p. 159 (TL, p. 342, Ls.
15-17; p. 342, L. 24

— p.

343, L. 7) (emphasis added).) Dr. Groben then testiﬁed:

Q. But they [the medical records] didn’t determine his [the Victim’s] cause
0f death?

A. No.
Q.

You

did?

A. Yes.
Q. Based on the

injuries that

he had when he was

at the hospital?

A. Right.

Ochoa’s argument

(Exhibits, p. 159 (TL, p. 343, Ls. 8-15) (holding original).)

that Dr.

Groben did not make an independent determination 0f the cause of the Victim’s death but
merely recited the cause found by others

C.

meritless.

is

AnV Error Was Harmless
Even

if

it

was

error to allow Dr.

Groben

to testify about the facts

and data

underlying his conclusion that the Victim died as a result of the accident, any error was
necessarily harmless because the evidence the Victim died as a result 0f the accident

overwhelming and uncontradicted. (Appellant’s
district court

found prejudice. (Respondent’s

brief, p. 3

1 .)

brief, p. 18.)

Ochoa argues only that

is

the

For the reasons stated in the

Appellant’s brief, any error was harmless.

CONCLUSION
The
the

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 reverse the

district court

judgment 0f the magistrate.

DATED this let day 0f July, 2020.

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
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